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A HIGH-TECH START-UP’S DEBT FINANCING STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
VALUING SOFT INFORMATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
How does entrepreneurial financing differ from traditional financing? This study sheds new light on this 
central question of entrepreneurial finance literature by exploring the distinctive role of soft information 
in a high-tech start-up’s debt financing. Entrepreneurial investors can obtain soft information from strong 
relationships with potential investees and use the information to evaluate and select promising investees. 
Using a dataset on 683 SBA 7(a) loan activities involved with information technology based start-ups, 
this study provides empirical evidence that high-tech start-ups tend to experience a lower rate of default if 
they are located close to the lending banks and the lending banks are of considerable size. These 
conditions allow the lending banks to collect and utilize soft information regarding high-tech start-ups in 
an efficient manner. 
 
1. Introduction 
 High-tech start-ups are often unprofitable and lack the necessary resources. As a result, they must 
gain access to external resources in order to exploit their entrepreneurial opportunities (Colombo and 
Grilli 2005; Beckman and Burton 2008). Financial capital is especially essential to procure other types of 
resources. These start-ups, however, often experience a “valley of death” transitional phase where 
developing technology is deemed promising yet without validated commercial potential (National 
Research Council 2009) and may fail to access the direct entrepreneurial finance market (e.g., private 
equity). To overcome these financial constraints in this phase, high-tech start-ups often access the lending 
market to continue exploiting their entrepreneurial opportunities. Indeed, banks are a critical source of 
financing for start-ups, providing about 60% of debt financing to small businesses (Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta 2014). Especially, start-ups have increasingly utilized the SBA 7(a) loan program through 
commercial banks in recent decades.   
 While the SBA 7(a) loan program provides a government-backed guarantee on the portion of 
loans, banks are supposed to select qualified start-ups and take a portion of responsibility associated with 
a default. This primary role of banks in the entrepreneurial finance is justified because they possess the 
continuing ability to evaluate, process, disburse, service, and liquidate entrepreneurial loans (Dilger 
2013). This unique role of banks raises a natural question about how entrepreneurial debt financing differs 
from traditional credit financing. Specifically, “what information do banks use to evaluate and select 
promising start-ups?” A growing body of finance literature suggests that banks are able to overcome the 
asymmetric information problem by producing information about potential borrowers and using it in the 
evaluation process. This question, however, remains not fully answered because such information is often 
unavailable in the entrepreneurial lending market due to the nature of start-ups, which are young and have 
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insufficient records about their operations. This question should be addressed in a new framework that 
can be applied in the context of entrepreneurial finance.   
 A stream of the literature I considered in this study is the literature on soft information, which can 
be readily applied within the context of entrepreneurial finance (Hodgman 1961; Kane and Malkiel 1965; 
Fama 1985; Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993; Petersen and Rajan 1994, Berger and Udell 1995; Boot 2000; 
Ongena and Smith 2000; Brau and Osteryoung 2001; Schenone 2004; Freixas 2005). High-tech start-ups 
often have private information about the value of their entrepreneurial opportunities. This information is 
not readily available for external stakeholders, including banks. This asymmetric information between 
start-ups and banks creates uncertainty about their credit worthiness (Cole 1998), leads to credit rationing 
equilibria (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), and invalidates other standard competitive market results (Broecker 
1990). By this unique nature of entrepreneurial lending market, theories that have been discussed in the 
literature of traditional credit market (e.g., perfect capital market, moral hazard, and adverse selection) 
cannot be applied in the entrepreneurial lending market in the exact same manner.  
 In the entrepreneurial lending market, banks may obtain private information about high-tech start-
ups through a continued relationship. This information can be used to set future contract terms or credit 
underwriting decisions. Banks necessarily use this “soft” information, which is difficult to quantify and 
transmit through the official communication channels, as well as “hard” information to provide 
entrepreneurial finance in an appropriate manner (Brau and Osteryoung 2001; Stein 2002). In contrast, 
these start-ups are likely to use their superior information position for their own benefits by selectively 
sharing their soft information with banks. This tendency may become stronger if focal start-ups have a 
high magnitude of soft information that would negatively affect banks’ decisions about whether the bank 
lends and what conditions banks offer.       
 Using a longitudinal dataset on 683 SBA 7(a) loans associated with information technology based 
start-ups between 1980 and 2005, this study provides empirical evidence that high-tech start-ups tend to 
experience a lower rate of default if they are located close to the lending banks and the lending banks are 
of considerable size. These conditions allow the lending banks to more efficiently collect and utilize soft 
information regarding start-ups. Specifically, high-tech start-ups that are reluctant to share their soft 
information, such as a perceived risk of default, may want to select banks that have difficulty reaching 
their soft information. These start-ups come to prefer banks that are distant from them (e.g., distance 
effect) and inferior to respond to local market competition (e.g., size effect). Furthermore, these distance 
and size effects interact with each other in determining the defaults. This interaction effect suggests that 
the distance effect is more salient when high-tech start-ups borrow from smaller banks, and vice versa.            
2. Literature and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. SBA 7(a) loan 
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The goal of SBA 7(a) loan is to help start-ups resolve their financial constraints by providing loan 
guarantee programs designed to encourage banks to provide entrepreneurial finance. Proceeds from SBA 
7(a) loans may be used to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion 
of an existing business. To be eligible for the loan, a start-up must be located in the United States, be a 
for-profit-operating business, qualify as small under the SBA’s size requirements, demonstrate a need for 
the desired credit, and be certified by a banker designated by the SBA. The maximum loan amount is up 
to $5 million (up to $3.75 million maximum guarantee). The average loan amount was $34,000 in 2012. 
The maximum loan term is typically 10 years, and can be extended up to 25 years with extensions. Banks 
are allowed to charge start-ups a reasonable fixed interest rate or a variable interest rate. The maximum 
allowable fixed interest rate in 2013 was 9.42%. The interest rates vary by the loan amount and are 
determined by a multi-step formula published in the Federal Register.    
 When a start-up submits an application for the SBA 7(a) loan, a bank reviews the application and 
decides whether it merits a loan on its own or not. The SBA guarantee assures the bank that, if the start-up 
does not repay the loan and the bank adhered to all applicable regulations concerning the loan, the SBA 
will reimburse the bank for its loss, up to the percentage of the SAB’s guarantee. If the bank determines 
that it is willing to provide the loan, but only with the SBA guarantee, it submits the application for 
approval to the Standard 7(a) Loan Guaranty Processing Center. These centers eventually decide whether 
or not to approve the applications. The SBA charges banks upfront a one-time guarantee fee and an 
annual ongoing servicing fee, which cannot exceed 5.55% per year of the outstanding balance of the 
SBA’s share of the loans. The bank may charge a start-up reasonable fees customary for similar banks in 
the geographic area where the loan is being made for packaging and other services.      
 There is a debate that the SBA should be provided additional resources to assist start-ups that 
would create more jobs (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989). 
Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal 
deficit and that many of the small businesses are not Schumpeterian innovators – they do not attempt to 
introduce new ideas, nor do they seek to enter a new or underserved market (Hurst and Pugsley 2011; 
Neumark et al. 2011; Haltiwanger et al. 2013). This debate is still ongoing in the literature. Some studies 
report that a small but positive and statistically significant relationship exists between guaranteed loans 
and regional economics (Riding and Haines Jr. 2001; Craig et al. 2007; Lee 2013). Young et al. (2014) 
find that the SBA lending activity has a negative effect on per capita income growth; and De Andrade and 
Lucas (2009) find that the SBA loan borrowers are charged rates that are no lower than on comparable 
uninsured securities.  
 It is surprising that little is known about what information banks do use to evaluate and select 
promising high-tech start-ups, which would facilitate long-term economic developments. It is important 
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to understand these issues because it helps us understand what strategy a start-up does use to obtain 
necessary entrepreneurial debt financing and how the entrepreneurial lending resource is allocated in an 
effective and efficient manner. In a broad sense, these issues explore what external contingencies shape 
the entrepreneurial finance market. By filling this gap in the literature, we are able to better understand 
how start-ups respond to overcome their financial constraints.   
2.2. Information asymmetry and soft information in the entrepreneurial lending market 
Start-ups want to acquire necessary capital to exploit their entrepreneurial opportunities, and 
banks need investment opportunities that match up deposits and borrows for reasonable rates of return. 
These two parties exchange their resources with each other in the entrepreneurial lending market. 
However, they may have difficulties when purchasing and exchanging resources, particularly due to 
limited information about each other (Duhaime and Schwenk 1985; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Coff 
1999; Reuer and Koza 2000; Barkema and Schijven 2008; Sleptsov and Anand 2008; Agarwal et al. 
2012). The conventional wisdom on the role of banks provides dichotomous perspectives. On one hand, 
banks constitute an important source of specialized information and expertise for entrepreneurial lending. 
On the other hand, the appropriate information flow from start-ups may not occur for a variety of reasons, 
including lack of recording, inadequate incentives, and conflicts of interests.    
Start-ups are typically much more informationally opaque than larger corporations because they 
often do not have certified audited financial statements to yield credible financial information on a regular 
basis (Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005). Due to this opacity, start-ups take superior positions in terms of 
the use of information, when compared with banks, and thus determine the ability and willingness of 
providing their private information (Hansen 1999). This information asymmetry is more salient within the 
context of high-tech based industries because high-tech start-ups often pursue technologies that would be 
the most important resources and difficult to understand without the expertise in the field. Banks, in 
contrast, should seek a number of lending technologies to cope with the information asymmetry. They 
necessarily use hard information and combine it with relatively limited data about start-ups using 
statistical methods to predict future credit performance. The hard information includes credit history, 
identifiable assets, and business data involved with the stock holders of start-ups. Hard information is 
useful because it is available in the secondary market with lower cost and yields significant growth in the 
credit availability of start-ups.    
For an alternative information source, banks use soft information gathered through contacts over 
time with start-ups, including the owners, managers, and other members of local communities. Soft 
information refers to any kind of data other than the relatively transparent and public information about 
the start-up such as financial statements or the availability of collateral. Soft information is essentially 
qualitative in nature, so it cannot be easily or verifiably recorded in written form (Garcıa-Appendini 
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2011). It takes a significant amount of time to accumulate soft information about start-ups. Banks may 
interchangeably use soft and hard information to allocate their credits among start-ups.     
2.3. Hypotheses development  
 Soft information may travel within a specific range of local community because such information 
is difficult to communicate and quantify. Banks often should have a local presence to maintain direct and 
indirect contacts with start-ups to collect soft information (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 
1995). Typically, this would increase the cost of having large scale, geographically spread-out lending 
operations, implying strong diseconomies of scale in the entrepreneurial lending (Petersen and Rajan 
2002). Beyond the range of community, start-ups are more likely to exert their efforts, if necessary, to 
conceal the soft information that would negatively affect the likelihood of loan approvals and contract 
terms.     
 As such, if the physical distance between start-ups and banks increases, the contacts between two 
parties may become more impersonal and dependent on hard information. The nature of this relationship 
gives start-ups the incentive to release hard information that is prepared by their loan professionals, such 
as brokers, accountants, and lawyers, in favor of them. Start-ups are also able to provide selected soft 
information in this regime. Thus, the distance between the two parties creates a greater information 
asymmetry. Especially, start-ups that perceive a high chance of default or predict the unpromising future 
of business are more likely to access banks at a distance. These banks may be unable to access the soft 
information. If this conjecture is true, we will see: 
 Hypothesis 1. High-tech start-ups are likely to experience a lower rate of default when they are 
close to the lending banks.  
 Large banks may be able to serve start-ups well by using a greater volume of hard information, 
such as credit scoring and lending against fixed asset collateral with values (Frame, Srinivasan, and 
Woosley 2001; Frame, Padhi, and Woosley 2004; Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005; Berger and Udell 
2006). Large banks have also recently come to maintain decentralized decision making structures and are 
able to respond more to local market competition (Canales and Nanda 2011), allowing them to have better 
access to soft information. Combining both types of information, large banks may outcompete in the 
entrepreneurial lending market. In other words, large banks can reduce information asymmetry by using 
their rich resources and better organizational structures that smaller banks would not emulate. As a result, 
start-ups that want to conceal the negative soft information are less likely to access large banks.  
Notice that contrary to my prediction, it can be argued that small banks are better able to form 
strong relationships with start-ups, while large banks tend to serve more transparent firms (Berger and 
Udell 2002; Stein 2002). This approach seems reasonable in the traditional lending market in which banks 
are able to prefer a specific group of applicants, but less so in the context of entrepreneurial lending 
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market. As long as large banks compete in the entrepreneurial lending market, their applicants cannot be 
transparent. If they maintain decentralized structure, the structure is likely to be advantageous for them in 
terms of accessing both soft and hard information. If this conjecture is true, we will see: 
Hypothesis 2. High-tech start-ups are likely to experience a lower rate of default when they 
borrow from the large banks.          
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Data 
For the purpose of this study, I utilized two data sources, including a dataset on SBA 7(a) loan 
activity involved with information technology based start-ups from the SBA via a Freedom of 
Information Act request, and the Bank Regulatory database available from Wharton Research Data 
Services. The SBA has several loan programs. Their main effort is the 7(a) loan program that facilitates 
loans to existing small businesses by guaranteeing varying percentages of loans. The maximum guarantee 
is typically 75% of the loan amount. I limited my sample within 7(a) loan program because this program 
is over 90% of loans approved by the SBA and intended to encourage long-term entrepreneurial financing 
for start-ups.  
The SBA provided a number of variables, including the identities of lending banks and start-ups, 
loan amounts, and interest rates associated with each individual loan. Furthermore, I was able to obtain 
data on loan failure (i.e., default) amounts on each loan. This data allows me to estimate the actual default 
rates of individual loans, which are, on average, 8% according to my sample. This actual default rate is 
considerably lower than the probability of SBA loan failures (i.e., 17%) estimated by prior studies 
(Treacy and Carey 1998; Glennon and Nigro 2005), and higher than the average loan failure rates of the 
U.S. commercial banks (i.e., 3.5%) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/delallsa.htm).      
The Bank Regulatory database provides financial accounting data for regulated depository 
financial institutions, including bank holding companies, commercial banks, saving banks, and saving and 
loans institutions. The source of the data comes from the required regulatory forms filed for supervising 
purposes. Specifically, I use the Commercial Bank database from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. It 
contains data from all banks filing the Report of Condition and Income that are regulated by the Federal 
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency. From these 
data sources, I was able to obtain the total amounts of assets and the net income of sample banks. My 
dataset is composed of 683 individual SBA 7(a) loans borrowed by information technology based start-
ups.     
3.2. Dependent variable: default  
 I define an outcome variable (i.e., default) as the log amount of default at the end of individual 
loan term. All dollar values are converted into 2005 constant dollars using the GDP deflator. Ideally, one 
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would measure the amount of default by observing at the time of loan approval to alleviate time-varying 
unobserved heterogeneity that may lead me to mistakenly estimate the effects of independent variables on 
default.1 However, such a measure is hardly available at the level of individual loan, except for a 
perceptual measure that also may lead to a bias in parameter estimation (Ketokivi and Schroeder 2004). 
For a sensitivity analysis, I use the rank variable of default (i.e., default rank). The greater rank denotes a 
greater value of default. This approach alleviates my concerns about the abnormal effects of outliers.  
3.3. Independent variables 
3.3.1. Distance  
Distance measures the linear distance between the zip codes of a start-up and a bank. All the 
longitude/latitude data came from the 2000 U.S. Census. I use a simple distance calculation method that 
calculates the distance in miles by passing the latitude and longitude coordinates. For a robust check and 
to refine the effect of distance, I also examine the effects of city and state boarder lines. I create a set of 
dummy variables, including same city and same state, and replace these variables with distance in some 
models. Same city equals one if a start-up borrows from a bank located within the borderline of same city, 
and zero otherwise. Similarly, same state equals one if a start-up does from a bank located within the 
borderline of same state, and zero otherwise.        
3.3.2. Bank size  
Bank size is measured by the log of total assets of a bank (Berger, Goulding, and Rice 2014). I 
believe this measure may capture the effect of bank size on what technologies will be used to evaluate 
loan applications by the bank. However, I also use national bank (16) and national bank (41) to elaborate 
the effect of bank size in some models for a sensitivity analysis. National bank (16) equals one if a bank 
has branches spanning 16 states (i.e., the mean of the number of states in which banks have branches in 
the sample), and zero otherwise. Similarly, national bank (41) equals one if a bank has branches in over 
41 states (i.e., the 90th percentile of the number of states in which banks have branches in the sample). 
These two variables will help examine the spatial size as well as the monetary size of bank.   
3.4. Control variables 
3.4.1. Loan characteristics  
The loan characteristics, including loan amount and loan interest rate, can impact the likelihood 
of the defaults of start-ups (Glennon and Nigro 2005; Riding and Haines 2001). The former is measured 
by the log of the amount of individual loans, and the latter is the interest rates approved with the loans. As 
the dollar amount of loan increases, banks are likely to utilize a more rigorous asset protection in the 
event that borrowers do not repay the bank credits, impacting the variation of default. Interest rates on 
                                                          
1 Variables names are in italic. 
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individual loans inversely reflect how start-ups have capacities to repay bank credits, and represent the 
financial burdens imposed on them.  
3.4.2. Bank net income  
Bank net income is measured by the log of a bank’s net income. Bank net income is a measure of 
banks’ financial performances and has been found to affect the likelihood of effective monitoring and 
controlling of the banks’ loan processes (Cole 1998). As such, banks that already have strong financial 
performances are more likely to select start-ups that are more likely to repay the bank credits.  
3.4.3. Fixed effects: Ownership, state, year fixed effects.   
I use several fixed effects in the following analyses. First, ownership fixed effects control for the 
ownership structure of start-ups. This variable is categorized into three groups, including sole 
proprietorships, limited partnerships, and corporations. The ownership structure can determine how much 
soft information banks will use. For example, a bank may need more soft information for a start-up that 
has a single owner because this start-up does not produce sufficient hard information. Second, state fixed 
effects control for states in which start-ups operate. These fixed effects control for institutional factors that 
are different among states, such as tax conditions and entrepreneurial policies. Finally, year fixed effects 
control for time varying conditions. The risk of default is not constant, but varies significantly over time 
according to the current economic conditions (Glennon and Nigro 2005).        
3.5. Empirical specification 
 I use two econometric approaches to estimate the effects of distance and bank size on default, 
including ordinary least squares (OLS) and negative binomial (NB) regressions. The OLS regression 
approach, which has been popular due to its simplicity, performs a one-tailed t-test on one variable of 
interest and all observable exogenous variables in the regression of other variables of interest (Lokshin et 
al. 2007). In the OLS specification, I estimate the following models: 𝐶𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, where 𝐶𝑖 
denotes my dependent variable, default; 𝑋𝑖 are independent variables of interest, including distance and 
bank size; and 𝑍𝑖 are control variables. Control variables include loan characteristics, bank characteristics, 
and several fixed effects. As a corollary analysis, I test interaction effects between distance and bank size 
using a production function approach that performs a simple one-tailed t-test on the interaction term of the 
two variables (e.g., distance and bank size).     
 For a sensitivity analysis, I use default rank, the rank variable of default, with negative binomial 
regression models. This specification uses the negative binomial distribution that is a discrete probability 
distribution of the number of successes in a sequence of independent and identically distributed Bernoulli 
trials before a specified number of failures occur. As discussed, this approach reduces my concerns about 
the abnormal effects of outliers. 
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 To refine the effects of distance and bank size on default, I use two approaches: segmented 
regression with seemingly unrelated (SU) post-estimation, and replacing new variables, including same 
city, same state, national bank (16), and national bank (41), with the existing variables of interest, 
respectively. The segmented regression approach is used to find the optimal range of independent 
variables to differentiate the effects of variables on the dependent variable. When analyzing a relationship 
between a dependent and an independent variable, it may be apparent that for different ranges of 
independent variables, different linear relationships occur. In these cases, a single linear model may not 
provide an adequate description and a nonlinear model may not be appropriate. Segmented regression is a 
form of regression that allows multiple linear models to be fit to the data for different ranges of 
independent variables. Breakpoints are the values of independent variables where the slope of the linear 
function drastically changes. I use SU post-estimation whether the resulting two regression coefficients of 
independent variable are statistically different or not. SU post-estimation consists of several regression 
equations (e.g., two regressions in my analysis), and each equation is a valid linear regression on its own. 
These equations are estimated separately and allow me to compare the resulting regression coefficients of 
independent variables that are included in both equations. 
 As discussed, to examine more specific effects of city and state boarder lines on default, I replace 
distance with same city and same state in some specifications. Moreover, I replace bank size with 
national bank (16) and national bank (41) in some specification to examine the effects of the range of 
locations covered by a bank on default.    
4. Empirical Results    
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. In Panel A, Group 1 (i.e., all samples) has 683 
observations and is categorized into two groups: Group 2 (i.e., default) and Group 3 (i.e., paid in full). 
Columns report the distribution of samples and the summary statistics categorized by my independent 
variables, including distance and bank size. The first column reports the distribution of all samples. Group 
2 has 56 observations and accounts for 8% of samples; and Group 3 has 627 observations and accounts 
for 92% of samples. The proportion of each group is overall consistent with the statistics provided by 
prior studies (e.g., De Andrade and Lucas 2009).   
 In the second column, I observe that Group 2 has, on average, a considerably greater distance 
(i.e., 250.32) than Group 3 does (i.e., 205.76). These differences are statistically significant at the 1% 
level and consistent with my prediction made in Hypothesis 1. I also observe, in the third column, that 
Group 3 indicates, on average, greater bank size (i.e., 13.20) than Group 2 does (i.e., 13.07). These 
statistics are supportive of my prediction made in Hypothesis 2. However, these statistics need to be 
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interpreted with caution because they are simply univariate results and may be biased due to unobserved 
heterogeneity.     
Panel B reports summary statistics for the five groups of variables used in the following analyses. 
These groups include dependent variables, variables of interest, loan characteristics, bank characteristics, 
and environmental characteristics. Start-ups borrow, on average, $274 thousand with a 9.97% interest 
rate. Banks have, on average, $8.50 billion of total assets; and $107 million of net incomes.2    
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
 Sample distribution Distance Bank size 
 N % Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
1. All samples 683 100.00 209.421 539.822 13.084 2.533 
2. Default 56 8.00 250.321 606.849 13.074 2.598 
3. Paid in full 627 92.00 205.768 533.814 13.195 2.528 
  
Panel B: Variables 
 All samples 
 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
1. Dependent variables      
Default 683 0.883 2.986 0.000 13.195 
Default rank 683 342.000 197.164 1.000 683.000 
      
2. Variables of interest      
Distance 683 209.422 539.823 0.000 2491.000 
Bank size 683 13.084 2.533 8.863 18.993 
      
3. Loan characteristics      
Loan amount 683 11.767 1.405 8.577 14.568 
Loan interest rate 683 9.970 2.657 4.250 23.250 
      
4. Bank characteristics      
Bank net income 683 8.511 2.796 0.693 14.525 
      
5. Environmental characteristics      
Ownership fixed effects 683 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 
State fixed effects 683 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 
Year fixed effects 683 N/A N/A 0.00 1.00 
 
4.2. Effects of distance and bank size on default  
 To understand the effects of distance and bank size on default, I obtain benchmark results by 
using several OLS and NB regression models presented in Table 2. Model 1 uses the OLS specification to 
estimate the effect of distance on default. Distance indicates a positive and significant regression 
                                                          
2 These numbers are calculated by converting logarithms back to natural numbers.  
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coefficient on default at the 1% level. More specifically, and by converting logarithms back to natural 
numbers, as the distance between a start-up and a bank increases beyond 1 mile, the amount of default 
increases, on average, $4.45. These statistics support my first hypothesis. Model 2 includes bank size as 
an independent variable and shows that bank size decreases default, with the effect statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This result supports my second hypothesis. For a corollary analysis, I include the 
interaction term of two independent variables (i.e., distance×bank size) to consider the interaction effects 
of two variables in Model 3. Distance×bank size indicates a negative and significant regression 
coefficient at the 1% level. These statistics suggest that the effect of distance on default is more salient 
when start-ups borrow loans from smaller banks. These interaction effects are illustrated in Figure 1. 
    
Figure 1. Interaction effects of distance and bank size 
 
 
  
To control for the abnormal effects of outliers, I use the NB specification using the rank variable 
of default, default rank, in Model 4. Consistent with the result in Model 1, distance indicates a positive 
and significant regression coefficient at the 1% level. These results suggest that my finding in Model 1 is 
robust against the effects of outliers. In Model 5, I replace distance with bank size. The results show that 
bank size has a negative and significant effect at the 1% level, supporting my finding in Model 2. I 
include all the independent variables of interest in Model 6 and find that these results are consistent with 
my findings in Model 3. As a result, I conclude that two hypotheses are supported. 
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Table 2. Effects of distance and bank size on default 
 
 OLS OLS OLS NB NB NB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Default Default Default 
Default 
rank 
Default 
rank 
Default 
rank 
Distance 
0.253***  1.290*** 0.021***  1.182*** 
(0.015)  (0.085) (0.001)  (0.006) 
Bank size 
 -0.073*** -0.082***  -0.811*** -0.911*** 
 (0.011) (0.012)  (0.112) (0.011) 
Distance×Bank size 
  -0.075***   -0.711*** 
  (0.005)   (0.023) 
Loan amount 
-0.455*** -0.464*** -0.415*** -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.361*** 
(0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.007) (0.007) (0.078) 
Loan interest rate 
-0.430*** -0.425*** -0.441*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.034*** 
(0.119) (0.118) (0.120) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Bank net income 
0.067 -0.016 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.003 
(0.061) (0.147) (0.152) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 
10.615*** 10.101*** 6.153*** 12.142*** 12.131*** 12.032*** 
(2.746) (2.830) (2.122) (0.134) (0.152) (0.154) 
       
Ownership fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 683 683 683 683 683 683 
F (Log likelihood) -1.6e+03 -1.6e+03 -1.6e+03 -7.7e+03 -7.7e+03 -7.7e+03 
Prob>F (Chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
R2 (Pseudo R2) 0.194 0.194 0.198 0.131 0.142 0.189 
Note. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Distance is divided by 
1000 to adjust its unit in the results.   
4.3. Refining the effects of distance and bank size on default  
 I further explore to refine the effects of distance and bank size on default in Table 3. In Models 1 
and 2, I carry out a segmented regression approach and optimize a break point (distance=20) where the 
slope of the linear function changes to better fit to the data for different ranges of distance. Specifically, in 
Model 1 I run an OLS regression model with the group of samples that report distance≤20. In Model 2, I 
run an OLS regression model with the group of samples that report distance>20. I find the regression 
coefficient of distance is 7.484 in Model 1. This slope significantly decreases to 0.186 in Model 2. SU 
post-estimation tests the regression coefficients of distance across Models 1 and 2, and shows two 
regression coefficients are significantly different at the 5% level (χ2=6.73 and Prob>χ2=0.018). These 
results suggest that I find robust empirical evidence that start-ups that borrow from non-local banks tend 
to experience greater rates of default. Moreover, this effect of distance is significantly greater within the 
range of 20 miles.      
 To examine more specific effects of border lines, I include same city and same state in Models 3 
and 4. While same city indicates -0.158 of regression coefficients with the effect statistically significant at 
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the 1% level in Model 3, same state indicates -0.060 of regression coefficient at the 1% level in Model 4. 
These contrasting regression coefficients can be interpreted in a way that if start-ups borrow 7(a) loans 
from banks located within the same city, their default risks considerably decrease. However, these 
boundary effects significantly decrease when start-ups borrow the loans from banks located within the 
same state. Conclusively, the effects of distance are greater when start-ups are located within the radius of 
20 miles from lending banks or within same city border lines. These results suggest that the role of soft 
information is salient within these spatial ranges; and it is not necessarily much greater as the distance 
increases.       
 In Models 5 and 6, I use similar steps from Models 1 and 2 to better fit the data for different 
ranges of bank size. I optimize a break point (bank size=11.69) and split the sample into two groups: bank 
size≤11.69 and bank size>11.69. While the regression coefficient of bank size in Model 5 is -0.012, bank 
size in Model 6 is 0.071. These results suggest that the negative effects of bank size on default are more 
salient in the range of bank size≤11.69. This finding is interpreted in a way that the size of banks 
decreases the likelihood of start-ups’ defaults when lending banks are small and medium size banks. 
However, these effects are not necessarily consistent for very large banks.   
 Given the positive effects of large banks on start-ups’ defaults, I redefine large banks as banks 
that operate in several states and use two independent variables, national bank (16) and national bank 
(41), in Models 7 and 8. In Model 7, national bank (16) indicates a negative and significant regression 
coefficient, suggesting that national banks that operate in at least 16 states have decreased defaults. In 
Model 8, the regression coefficient of national bank (41) is considerably greater than that of national 
bank (16) in Model 7, suggesting that national banks that operate over 41 states have significantly 
increased the defaults. Combined together, I conclude that start-ups’ defaults tend to decrease as the size 
of lending bank increases up to a point, but when the bank is too large, the defaults begin to increase. 
Arguably, this is because a large bank, when compared with its competitors, has difficulty maintaining a 
decentralized decision making structure that allows it to respond more to local market competition 
(Canales and Nanda 2011). 
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Table 3. Refining the effects of distance and bank size on default 
 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable Default Default Default Default Default Default Default Default 
Distance 
7.484*** 0.186***   0.433*** 0.053*** 0.238*** 0.064*** 
(1.853) (0.013)   (0.038) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) 
Bank size 
0.078 -0.174*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.012 0.071***   
(0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.032) (0.018)   
Same city 
  -0.158***      
  (0.011)      
Same state 
   -0.060***     
   (0.020)     
National bank (16) 
      -0.045**  
      (0.019)  
National bank (41) 
       1.199* 
       (0.689) 
Loan amount 
-0.315** -0.538*** -0.474*** -0.455*** -0.362* -0.565*** -0.417*** -0.418*** 
(0.158) (0.124) (0.094) (0.092) (0.205) (0.132) (0.091) (0.099) 
Loan interest rate 
-0.375*** -0.661*** -0.431*** -0.433*** -0.385* -0.563*** -0.430*** -0.441*** 
(0.141) (0.235) (0.119) (0.120) (0.221) (0.151) (0.117) (0.120) 
Bank net income 
0.170 0.014 -0.011 -0.009 -0.413 -0.002 -0.002 0.058 
(0.347) (0.184) (0.149) (0.148) (0.318) (0.233) (0.064) (0.059) 
Constant 
7.120* 3.963 10.678*** 10.506*** -1.039 9.328** 9.920*** 10.380*** 
(3.996) (7.073) (2.883) (3.024) (6.185) (3.691) (2.693) (2.772) 
         
SME structure fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
N 380 303 683 683 261 422 683 683 
F (Log likelihood) -915.283 -669.711 -1.6e+03 -1.6e+03 -628.716 -965.414 -1.6e+03 -1.6e+03 
Prob>F (Chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 (Pseudo R2) 0.263 0.370 0.196 0.194 0.274 0.309 0.209 0.199 
Note. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Distance is divided by 1000 to adjust its unit in the 
results. SU post-estimation tests the regression coefficients of distance across Models 1 and 2, and shows two regression coefficients are 
significantly different at the 5% level (χ2=5.73 and Prob>χ2=0.0167). Similarly, regression coefficients of bank size are significantly different at 
the 1% level across Models 5 and 6 (χ2=43.97 and Prob>χ2=0.000).   
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 This paper examines what information is used to evaluate and select promising high-tech start-
ups in the entrepreneurial lending market. Based on SBA 7(a) loan activities involved with information 
technology based start-ups, this study finds that these start-ups tend to experience a lower rate of default if 
they are close to the lending banks and the lending banks are of considerable size. These conditions 
facilitate the lending banks to collect and utilize soft information regarding the focal start-ups.      
 These findings clarify the contributions of this study. First, the prior literature has not fully 
examined the nature of information used in the entrepreneurial lending market. This study attempts to 
fulfill this gap in the entrepreneurial finance literature by analyzing the defaults of high-tech start-ups. 
This analysis highlights the relational configuration between high-tech start-ups and lending banks. By 
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doing so, this study contributes to the ongoing debate about the optimal mechanism for nurturing high 
technology based entrepreneurs by the SBA.   
 Secondly, my findings expand our understanding about the entrepreneurial lending market by 
examining how a lending bank’s location and size serve to access soft information regarding high-tech 
start-ups. This study suggests that a bank’s capacity to access soft information reduces information 
asymmetry between the bank and high-tech start-ups, thereby enhancing effective selections on promising 
high-tech start-ups.   
 Finally, this study expands the information asymmetry theory within the context of 
entrepreneurial lending market. This theoretical application is particularly suitable to analyze how high-
tech start-ups are willing to reveal soft information and what information lending banks use to reduce 
information asymmetry that is common in the entrepreneurial lending market.  
 Limitations from this study provide avenues for future research. This study did not fully consider 
the characteristics of start-ups mainly due to the lack of available data. To alleviate this concern, at least 
in part, this study used several fixed effects, including ownership, state, and year fixed effects. These 
fixed effects, however, cannot perfectly control for the several characteristics of high-tech start-ups, 
including firm specific technology and operation factors. Future studies need to examine how a start-up’s 
specific characteristics interact with its entrepreneurial debt financing strategy to enhance the start-up’s 
consequent performance.  
 Furthermore, future studies could probe more deeply into what financing sources a start-up tried 
to access, how it behaved with the financing sources, and whether the access was successful, prior to 
obtaining SBA loans. For example, it is possible that a start-up searched lending opportunities at larger or 
local banks but was rejected prior to applying for SBA loans at a distant bank. This possibility may 
provide alternative explanations for the empirical results of this study. Future studies need to more fully 
explore the dynamics of a start-up’s debt financing activities.   
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